In Yevamos 52b we learn about the tragic story of talmidei R' Akiva that was
due to the fact that 'lo nahagu kavod zeh lazeh? - They did not act
with honor one to another.
The Maharsha says that they verbally degraded each other & therefore
their punishment was a fatal condition associated with the mouth.
While this explains what they did wrong & the midah k'neged midah,
however the lashon of the gemara - shelo nahagu kavod - does not seem
to be a positive act of degradation, rather what they did NOT do -
shev v'al tasseh.
The untimely death of twenty four thousand torah students because of
what seems to be just a deficiency in some midas chassidus is quite
perplexing and requires study.
The gemara (kiddushin 39b) relates the story of the unnatural death of
a son who went up a tree to do shiluach hakein & bring a bird for his
father. The gemara provides a possibilty for his mid-mitzvah tragedy
because he may have sinned with thoughts of avodah zarah while doing
the mitzvah.
The Dibros Moshe states that the gemarah could not attribute his
unnatural death to improper thoughts of women, for although the
prohibition against it is d'oraisah, it still would not result in such
a death.
Similarly, from the fact the talmidei R? Akiva died the bitter &
unnatural death of ask'ra, it seems not to have been due to a lack of
midas chassidus. (One may argue on the comparison from a typical boy
to an expected level of chassidus of talmidei R? Akiva.)
The Maharsha (& others with different nuances - mishnas R? Aharon,
michtav meEliyah, maharal) learn this as a problem
in the kavod haTorah of each other. However the general 'velt? seems
to learn as the Iyun Yakov notes, that this is a story of lack of
simple bein adam l'chaveiro. Yet from the severity of punishment it
appears as a real transgression of
some issur min hadin. If this is so, it requires understanding as from
where do we find a real chiyuv of kavod to another equal Jew (not
because of his Torah) who is not a parent, Rebbi, or elder?
The gemara shabbos 31a relates the incident with the ger who ask to
learn all of Torah on one foot. Regarding the well-known response of
Hillel "mai d'alach sani l'chavrach lo savid? the maharsha points out
that this was said in the negative rather than positive form - love
your friend as yourself, because truthfully, in the positive, it's not
required to love another as much as one's self rather 'chayecha
kodmim'.
Similarly, the Ramban on the passuk ve'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha
(kedoshim 19.18) says that one is not required, NOR CAPABLE, of loving
another equally with himself. However the Ramban states that although
we can't love another as much as ourselves, we are commanded against
specifically wanting another to have LESS than ourselves. What's
amazing from this Ramban is even though if you're not doing or wishing
you friend any HARM - just less massive wealth, wisdom, or blessing
than yourself, it is already transgressing this mitzvah.
The maharsha may still hold that one is able to love that much, but
definitely not commanded to do so actively. This leaves room perhaps
for the literal positive form of the passuk to be a chiyuv in the
heart and 'chayecha kodmin in ma'aseh.
On a side note, it appears from the gemara yevamos 61a that with
regards to one's wife we are capable of completely equal ahava (and
perhaps then required so as well) which goes in tandem with the fact
of ishto k'gufo ? she IS like yourself. R? Avraham Gurwitz in Toras
Avraham on Rambam Yesodi HaTorah & De'os suggests that regarding one's
wife there might not be a din of chayecha kodmin at all, as she must
be treated totally kamocha. It is interesting that one is also
encouraged to honor his wife more than himself. This may be due to the
fact that since ishto k'gufo, unless one shows a distinction between
his own honor and that of his wive's, it would be rendered self love
and he has not fulfilled the requirement of v'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha
in her. Certainly this distinction cannot be in the form of less
honor as that would transgress the general chiyuv of kamocha as
metioned by the Ramban above.
Please note the Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos assay 206 & in hilchos de'os
6.3 seems to hold that one is capable & required
to have complete equal love for another without any limitations. The
Rambam would have to say that chayecha kodmin only applies to acts &
deeds, but the actual love & good will towards another must be equal
to oneself.
Based on the Ramban and above Maharsha (and many other classic
rishonim and achronim), we may conclude as follows. The equal love of
'kamocha? required by the Torah, is not to allow oneself priority over
his friend by treating or even FEELING towards the other any more
NEGATIVELY than toward yourself.
The question remains what kavod was demanded of talmidei R? Akiva min
hadin, that is associated with the mouth and yet that was not
fulfilled b'shev v'al ta'aseh?
Kavod takes on many forms and has various expressions. Standing up for
Talmidei Chachomim, preparing food, clothing, and escorting parents in
or out. Dressing and eating differently than normal is kavod chol
hamoed as brought by R? Yonah in Avos.
R? Shlomo Wolbe in alei shur offers an enlightening definition of the
word Kavod. It may well be 'substantial'. Kaved means
heavy, meaning containing more mass/substance. (Accordingly, kaved
rosh as opposed
to kalus rosh is a mind that is either heavy with substancial thought
or light without
substancial thought.)
There is another thing which I found to be interesting as an example
for kavod, but based on this definition it sheds a great light upon
this sugyah. The mesilas Yeshorim in perek 22 describes deeds of
anavah - humbleness. One of the manners of a humble person, is to
honor others. The prime example of this is "hevei makdim shalom l'chol
adam". At first glance this does not appear to be an act of kavod,
rather a polite manner that enhances human relationships. However, in
truth this may be Kavod in its purest & simplest form. Acting in a way
that REGARDS the SUBSTANTIAL EXISTENCE OF THE OTHER. Although this may
not fit with the classic english definition of the word kavod, however
the Ramchal clearly defines this simple act as kavod.
To understand this a bit deeper, the Maharal regarding the sugyah of
ona'as devarim (baba metziah 58b) explains that the mishnah's first
case of ona'ah is the defining example for what ona'as devarim is.
This is the case of one who asks a merchant for the price of an item
without any intention to buy it. It seems that this is ona'ah even
when the merchant doesn't realize his time time is being wasted. The
Maharal explains that this defines ona'ah, as taking advantage of
another to the point where the victim is degraded - even if just in
the eyes of the offender - to be just an object of entertainment as
opposed to a human of intrinsic value.
Perhaps we can add along these lines, that noticing another Jew and
acting as if he didn't exist, or is less "substantially existent" than
yourself, by ignoring his presence is a direct transgression of
v'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha, as explained by the Ramban. This is the
minimal form of kavod due to any individual - that his existence as a
human with feelings be recognized. Hevai makdim Shalom l'chol adam may
very well be the halachically required, d'oraisah chiyuv, of kavod
that we are all commanded to do for another Jew regardless of his his
age or wisdom. This can be the shev v'al taasaeh lack of kavod that
was required of the talmidei R? Akiva min hadin. This is also a
universal form of kavod performed with the mouth, and hence the
punishment of assk"ra.
Let us all be TALMIDEI CHACHOMIM MARBIM SHALOM BA'OLAM.
